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Abstract. The ubiquitous use of predispute arbitration clauses in employee and consumer contracts
has hidden a generation of wrongdoing behind confidential and unreviewable decision-making. With
individuals lacking the bargaining power to refuse these provisions and Congress unable to pass
meaningful reform to prevent them, it is time for the states to step in and restore the adjudicatory
guarantees that have been eroded by increasingly severe arbitration procedures. This Article begins
with a survey of the legal and policy background of mandatory arbitration in the United States and
introduces an emerging interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act that grants states the power to
regulate arbitration without fear of federal preemption. The interpretation is then analyzed against
nationwide precedent and is scrutinized for its viability outside of its current Ninth Circuit domain. If
this understanding of federal law continues to proliferate, states can foster meaningful accountability
within arbitration by providing consumers and employees with transparent dispute resolution
practices and a revived ability to aggregate small-dollar claims.
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Vanina Guerrero, a former partner at global law firm DLA Piper, is barred from facing her
credibly accused abuser in court.1 Due to a predispute arbitration clause in her employment
agreement, Ms. Guerrero’s claims of repeated sexual assault by a direct supervisor cannot proceed
publicly through the court system.2 Instead, any claim filed would be diverted into opaque and
practically unreviewable arbitration proceedings against her will, shielding any facts uncovered or
outcomes reached from public view.3 In response to these restrictive employment terms, Ms.
Guerrero published an open letter demanding that DLA Piper “[r]elease [her] from forced arbitration
and allow [her] to assert [her] civil claims for assault, battery, sexual harassment and retaliation in our
transparent court system.”4 The firm suspended her the following week.5
Vanina Guerrero’s situation is far from unique: an estimated 60 million American workers
are barred from accessing the court system in actions implicating their employer, including over half
of the country’s nonunion, private sector employees.6Moreover, this figure does not begin to account
for the number of American consumers bound by similar arbitration agreements when purchasing
1 See DLA Piper Hit by Law Student Protests over Arbitration, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 10, 2019, 2:15 P.M.),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/dla-piper-offices-hit-by-law-student-protests-over-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/VH5F-EW8P].
2 See id. These sexual misconduct claims were echoed by the similar experiences of a human resources manager, an
administrative assistant, and a professional responsibility counsel with the same managing partner. See Dan Packel, Ex-DLA
Piper Ethics Counsel Alleges Firm Tolerated ‘Abuse of Power’ by Ousted Partner, AM. LAW. (Oct. 23, 2019, 1:32 PM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/10/23/ex-dla-piper-ethics-counsel-alleges-firm-tolerated-abuse-of-power-by-
ousted-partner/ [https://perma.cc/KGL7-XZM6]; Dan Packel, Third Accuser Files EEOC Claim About Former DLA Piper
Partner, AM. LAW. (Nov. 7, 2019, 5:05 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/11/07/third-accuser-files-eeoc-
claim-about-former-dla-piper-partner/ [https://perma.cc/A6B8-XA2Y]; Ross Todd, Second Woman Files EEOC Claim About
Former DLA Piper Partner, THE RECORDER (Oct. 21, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/10/21/second-
woman-files-eeoc-claim-about-former-dla-piper-partner/ [https://perma.cc/RX5Q-6XR8].
3 See Ramona L. Lampley, “Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1727, 1733
(2015) (acknowledging the “general criticism that arbitration is simply not transparent”, and noting that “[m]ost arbitration
disputes do not result in published opinion . . . “); Stephen Wills Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 889 (2010) (“Generally, parties are bound by the decisions of arbitrators, and courts may not review
arbitrators’ findings of fact or conclusions of law.”).
4 Open Letter from Vanina Guerrero to Roger Meltzer and Jay Rains, Co-Chairs, DLA Piper 2 (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://src.bna.com/LOo [https://perma.cc/M2V4-577Y].
5 Braden Campbell, DLA Piper, Ex-Practice Leader Face New Sex Bias Charge, LAW360 (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:06 P.M.),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1211782/dla-piper-ex-practice-leader-face-new-sex-bias-charge [https://perma.cc/7M5C-
JUK2]; see also Lizzy McLellan & Dan Packel, DLA Piper Removes Female Partner Who Alleged Sex Assault, Triggering ‘Smear
Campaign’ Accusation, AM. LAW. (Oct. 16, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/10/16/dla-piper-
removes-female-partner-who-alleged-sex-assault-triggering-smear-campaign-accusation/ (“The firm . . . in its statement,
emphasized that the allegations against her are completely unrelated to her own allegations against Lehot.”)
[https://perma.cc/G5WH-KQ9Y].
6 See ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THEGROWINGUSE OFMANDATORY ARBITRATION
2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6QG-7C9Q] (extrapolating from data showing that
56.2% of American private-sector nonunion employees are bound by forced arbitration proceedings, with 53.9% of nonunion
private-sector employers and 65.1% of companies with over 1,000 employees having such procedures).
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goods or services.7
In the consumer context, companies implement arbitration provisions to guard against
anything from disputes over credit installment plans to internet sweepstakes,8 and consumers can be
bound by these agreements just by browsing a retailer’s website.9 From credit card services to
transportation companies, these agreements prevent consumers from using the court system to make
themselves whole.10
When an Amtrak train careened off its track and killed eight passengers in 2015, the
resulting lawsuit filed on behalf of those passengers and their survivors resulted in a $265 million
settlement paid out by the company.11 Five years later, Amtrak added an arbitration clause to every
purchased ticket preventing passengers killed or injured while traveling from suing in court.12 If this
2015 crash were to happen today, passengers and their survivors could not use the public court
system to seek relief for their injuries and damages, and Amtrak would remain free from the threat of
damaging depositions or any public revelations of wrongdoing.13
This Article explores how states may hold the key to limiting the excesses of mandatory
7 See Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 233, 234 (2019) (“At least a majority of the households in the United States (and possibly almost two-thirds) are
covered by broad consumer arbitration agreements.”); Press Release, Consumer Reports, Groups Launch Nationwide Effort to
Stop Use of Binding Mandatory Arbitration Clauses (Feb. 24, 2005), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/
consumer-groups-call-for-end-to-use-of-binding-mandatory-arbitration-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/BNK7-2T4Q] (“There is
probably not a single adult in the United States who is not subject to at least one binding mandatory arbitration clause – and
most are subject to many.”); see also Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES: THE
UPSHOT (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-third-of-top-websites-restrict-customers-right-
to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/2J93-FXZE] (discussing the use of arbitration agreements by “one-third of top websites”).
8 See Szalai, supra note 7, at 239 (citing Amazon, Walmart, Home Depot, and Lowe’s as companies mandating
arbitration for consumer claims and noting the broad range of consumer transactions covered by arbitration clauses).
9 Reading the terms of service in software and user agreements is a practice that few, if any, consumers can or do take
seriously, despite the massive consequences involved. See DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US
EDITION 12 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-
telecommunications/us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GUY-KWJA];
Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2256, 2277–79 (2019) (using the Flesch
Reading Ease test and the Flesch-Kincaid test to determine that the typical readability of online terms of service is equivalent to
that of “articles found in academic journals” and therefore “unlikely to be understood by consumers”); see also Merrill, supra
note 7 (examining the prevalence of “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements in online terms of service).
10 See, e.g., Apple Card Customer Agreement, GOLDMAN SACHS 16, https://www.goldmansachs.com/terms-and-
conditions/Apple-Card-Customer-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNH7-596D] (including a confidentiality provision
establishing that “[the parties] agree that any arbitration proceedings initiated hereunder shall be kept confidential”) (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021); Sam Mintz, Amtrak’s New Ticket Rules Won’t Let Passengers Sue in a Crash, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:35 P.M.),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/08/amtrak-crash-sue-068175 [https://perma.cc/5LP8-8BH9].
11 See Mintz, supra note 10.
12 See Terms and Conditions, AMTRAK (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.amtrak.com/terms-and-conditions.html
#arbitrationAgreement-arbitrationAgreement [https://perma.cc/6VYH-KHYJ]; see also Mintz, supra note 10 (explaining that
this arbitration clause is “unusually broad and detailed” and describing the detail with which Amtrak waives civil liability).
13 See Amtrak Cannot Force Passengers to Agree to Arbitration, Lawsuit Says, PUB. CITIZEN (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.citizen.org/news/amtrak-cannot-force-passengers-to-agree-to-arbitration-lawsuit-says/ [https://perma.cc/9KSN
-XB2N] (“Had its forced arbitration provision been in place at the time, the victims and their families would not have been




predispute arbitration clauses and proposes solutions to a problem afflicting millions of Americans
like Vanina Guerrero. Part I outlines the primary criticisms of mandatory arbitration and examines
the current statutory and judicial framework regulating the practice. Part II analyzes how a Ninth
Circuit interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) could expand the power of states to
rein in aggressive arbitration provisions and assesses this interpretation’s viability against nationwide
precedent. Part III proposes a guide for leveraging the Ninth Circuit interpretation to vindicate the
rights of exploited workers and consumers. Finally, the Article concludes by advocating for legislation
up to the hilt of state authority to combat the significant abuses left unchecked by current law.
I. ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE LEGAL LIMITS TO STATE INTERVENTION
A. Arbitration’s Asymmetric Justice
Arbitration imperils legal protections in ways that are as subtle as they are serious. One of
the primary critiques of the arbitration process is that its exemption from judicial review allows
incidences of bias in the judgment and decision-making of arbitrators to go unchecked by higher
courts.14 Absent the guaranteed right to appeal, parties end their dispute without an opportunity for a
second opinion or any assurance of accuracy. Predispute arbitration agreements often restrict parties’
traditional protections even further, commonly prohibiting, for example, the right to proceed in
solidarity as a class.15 These restrictions and opportunities for abuse are compounded when
arbitration agreements include provisions ensuring the confidentiality of every proceeding. The
guarantee of confidentiality shields the entire project from public scrutiny and leaves unanswered
critical questions about prejudice, fairness, and principled judgment.16
14 See David B. Saxe, Adding a Right of Appeal in Arbitration, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 2019, 11:45 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/16/adding-a-right-of-appeal-in-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/S9VH-
Z88G] (noting “the frequency with which errors of law are made by arbitrators possibly because they are protected by the strict
enforcement of finality”). See generally Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985) (discussing how arbitration and other informal dispute resolution mechanisms
lack the formality and procedural protections of the court system that reduce bias and level the playing field for relatively
disempowered disputants).
15 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, supra note 12 (“The parties agree to bring any claim or dispute in arbitration on an
individual basis only, and not as a class or representative action, and there will be no right or authority for any claim or dispute
to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class or representative action . . . “); see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/UBG7-BHWT]
(“Some state judges have called the class-action bans a ‘get out of jail free’ card, because it is nearly impossible for one
individual to take on a corporation with vast resources.”).
16 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights,
124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2816 (2015) (“Without public access, one cannot know whether fair treatment is accorded regardless of
status. . . . And without public accountings of how legal norms are being applied, one cannot debate the need for revisions.”);
see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 28–31
(2015) (arguing that confidentiality provisions within arbitration clauses, not the process itself may be responsible for hiding
business wrongdoing); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-
of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/FM6G-TFQ5] (“Little is known about arbitration because the proceedings are
confidential and the federal government does not require cases to be reported.”); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 15
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Over the past few decades, numerous empirical studies have lent weight to concerns about
the potential for bias in arbitration.17 One notable investigation found that, in the employment
arbitration context, complainants succeeded in only 21.4 percent of cases, compared with
complainants’ success in 57 percent of employment cases in state court and 36.4 percent of
employment cases in federal court.18 These disparities reveal a marked decrease in success for
employees pursuing their claims through arbitration as opposed to state or federal court.
The success gap may be attributed in part to a phenomenon commonly referred to as the
“repeat player effect,”19 a theory that arbitrators reward reliable customers who return to the same
arbitrator or arbitration company. Arbitration is a business, and as such, arbitrators have an economic
incentive to provide returning companies with favorable results or risk losing them to someone else.20
When large companies repeatedly hire the same arbitrators, the consumers and employees appearing
before that arbitrator—for what is likely the first and only time—will be at a significant disadvantage
because they fail to present the same lucrative incentives that contribute to structuring the decision-
making process.
Although critics of the “repeat player effect” claim the phenomenon is overstated, empirical
data suggest repeat player employers have markedly higher odds of success.21 A study conducted in
(“Part of the problem . . . is that arbitration keeps any discussion of discriminatory practices hidden from other workers ‘who
might be experiencing the same thing.’”); Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration in
Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/technology/facebook-arbitration-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/QRL7-82AQ] (“Because the claims are often kept under wraps in confidential arbitration
hearings, critics say harassers often move easily to other jobs without warning to future victims.”).
17 See, e.g., CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY, § 5, at 13 (2015), https://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN5Y-C7WC]
(identifying that some form of relief was provided to consumers in 20.3% of studied arbitrations); Alexander J. S. Colvin, An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2011) (finding employee
win rates of 21.4%, 36.4%, and 57% in arbitration, federal court, and state court respectively, and median awards of $36,500,
$150,500, and $68,737, respectively); cf. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 15 (identifying that “the rules of arbitration
largely favor companies, which can even steer cases to friendly arbitrators”). But see David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563–78 (2005) (discussing the problems with
some empirical studies of arbitration outcomes and concluding that comparisons of win/loss and damages rates are
inconclusive).
18 See Colvin, supra note 17.
19 See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Unlike the labor case, in which both
union and employer are regular participants in the arbitration process, only the employer is a repeat player in cases involving
individual statutory claims. As a result, the employer gains some advantage in having superior knowledge with respect to
selection of an arbitrator.”). See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) (noting the significance of Cole v. Burns and providing one of the earliest studies of the “repeat player
effect”).
20 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 16 (quoting Anthony Kline, a California appeals court judge as saying,
“This is a business and arbitrators have an economic reason to decide in favor of the repeat players.”).
21 See Bingham, supra note 19, at 209–10; Colvin, supra note 17, at 18–19; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 17, § 5, at 67–68 (finding some evidence of a “repeat player effect” on consumer arbitration
but cautioning that there were too few cases involving a non-repeat company to draw firm conclusions). But see Elizabeth Hill,
AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2003, at 8, 15 (identifying that only two cases
out of 200 surveyed involved a second meeting between the same arbitrator and employer, and concluding that this was “not a




2011 found that employees win 31.6 percent of cases when placed on an even playing field with their
employer, while only 16.9 percent of employees win cases when the repeat player effect applies.22
This disparity in employee success rates between repeat player employers and non-repeat player
employers lends credence to the effect’s existence and underscores its pernicious impact on workers’
ability to recover damages.
Arbitration advocates argue that by avoiding the increased time, cost, and emotional turmoil
of civil litigation, arbitration provides a fairer and more accessible option for all parties.23 Supporters
trivialize the more aspirational elements of the judicial system’s promise, emphasizing that many of
the advantages and protections promised by courts are rarely utilized except to gain leverage during
settlement proceedings.24 If arbitration is compared against a baseline of little to no judicial recourse,
it appears to be a practical and swift avenue to restitution. This comparison between arbitration and
litigation may be compelling in a discussion of the merits of elective arbitration itself, but the removal
of self-determination in mandatory arbitration fundamentally changes the debate.25
Despite this strong defense by practitioners and private enterprise, some advocates continue
to claim that arbitration lacks a “natural defender” against its critics.26 This assumption may yet be
premature, as time and repeated cases have shown arbitration’s most ardent protector to be the U.S.
Supreme Court.
she found no support for arbitrator bias).
22 See Colvin, supra note 17, at 13.
23 See Hill, supra note 21, at 16 (demonstrating that research showed arbitration “offers an affordable, fair, alternative
adjudication forum”); Sherwyn et al., supra note 17, at 1578 (“[A]rbitration is faster. Because employment dispute resolution can
be both heart wrenching and financially crippling, a quicker resolution is a positive.”). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in
Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407,
408 (1997) (“To the extent that proponents . . . were attracted to it because of its promise of flexibility, adaptability, and
creativity, we now see the need for ethics, standards of practice and rules as potentially limiting and containing the promise of
alternatives to rigid adversarial modes of dispute resolution.”).
24 See Andrew J. Pincus, Remarks at the Federalist Society 2019 National Lawyers Convention, Arbitration in the
#MeToo Era, at 40:38 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2019national-lawyers-convention#agenda-item-
arbitration-in-the-metoo-era-1; see also Model Arbitration Statute Offered: American Arbitration Association, Powerfully Supported by
Commercial Interests, Advances Voluntary Procedure – Lawyers Have New Opportunity, 10 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 122, 123 (1926)
(arguing in 1926 that “[t]he lawyer can utilize arbitration as an instrument to afford his client real justice, as against mere
theoretical justice.”). But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 213, 258 (2005) (explaining how arbitration arose when “[t]he social need for access to workable dispute resolution
trumped the value placed in the integrity of legal principles and in the fairness and legitimacy borne of rigorous due process. . . .
[and when the] rhetoric of symbolic rights had become too costly in contemporary society”).
25 See Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141,
143 (articulating the need for a greater conception of justice in arbitration, particularly in instances where consent to the
procedures is placed in doubt).
26 See Pincus, supra note 24, at 25:14 (noting that “arbitration doesn’t have a natural defender” or “an actual PR
proponent”).
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B. Reimagining Federal Preemption in the Arbitration Arena
1. The history and legal development of the FAA
In 1925, Congress passed and President Coolidge signed the United States Arbitration Act
(commonly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act or FAA), securing the validity of predispute
arbitration clauses within contracts.27 Section 1 of the FAA lays out the statute’s scope,28 while
section 2 establishes the default enforceability and irrevocability of predispute arbitration clauses.29
The final clause of section 2 (the “savings clause”), however, establishes that enforceability depends
on the agreement not being invalidated “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”30 This caveat prompted state legislatures to pass laws and state courts to
issue rulings that invalidated certain restrictive arbitration agreements on public policy grounds.
A notable example of such state action was California’s response to arbitration agreements
that forbade plaintiffs from joining together in class actions.31 In a series of cases over a five year
period, the California Supreme Court used the FAA’s savings clause to declare unenforceable any
arbitration agreement that included a class action waiver, finding the waivers contrary to public
policy.32 This use of the FAA’s savings clause was short-lived, however, as California’s rule protecting
the right to class arbitration was struck down when the issue reached the Supreme Court in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.33
27 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16).
28 Section 1 contains an exception stating that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis
added). This clause, along with the FAA’s legislative history, led at least one court to view the exception as forbidding
arbitration clauses in any employment agreement. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110–11 (2001) (“[T]he
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that all employment contracts are excluded from the FAA conflicts with every other Court of
Appeals to have addressed the question.”). This argument that the FAA did not apply to employment agreements broadly was
put to rest by the Supreme Court, which held that the section 1 exception only encompassed workers employed in the
transportation industry. Circuit City, 5 U.S. at 109; see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (applying the Circuit
City holding to exempt a truck driver from an arbitration agreement). But see Circuit City, 5 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority was “[p]laying ostrich to the substantial history behind the amendment”).
29 Section 2 ensures the enforceability of arbitration clauses and the Supreme Court has stipulated that they are just as
valid as all other contracts. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“[C]ourts must place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms.”) (internal citations omitted);
see also infra Section I.B.2 (elaborating on the modern interpretation of this section).
30 9 U.S.C. § 2.
31 See generally Merrill, supra note 7 (commenting that “legal provisions, known as forced arbitration clauses and class
action ban clauses, have long been included in complex offline contracts like car leases”); Irma Reboso Solares, Considerations for
Use of Arbitration Agreements to Curtail Class Claims, NAT’L L. REV. (July 21, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
considerations-use-arbitration-agreements-to-curtail-class-claims [https://perma.cc/AJ9M-HRK2].
32 See e.g. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1116 (Cal. 2005) (“‘Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston
Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.’ We continue to
believe that the alternatives— [refusing to enforce the agreement entirely or inoculating parties against classwide liability] —are
unacceptable.”) (quoting Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982)).
33 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. At least one commentator viewed this decision as sounding a “death knell” to




In Concepcion, the Court read the FAA’s saving clause narrowly, establishing that the savings
clause does not “suggest[] an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”34 The underlying objective, according to the Court, is the
promotion of arbitration specifically because of its informal, streamlined proceedings.35 As applied to
California’s protection of class arbitration, the Court found that a state-mandated shift from
traditional arbitration between two parties to arbitration between a party and a class “sacrifices the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”36 Because class proceedings would
make arbitration more formal and complex and frustrate the objectives of the FAA, the Court held
that the statute preempted California’s rule.37 While the decision in Concepcion may not have directly
affected someone like Vanina Guerrero, who was not a member of a class, it set a precedent that the
FAA preempts any state regulation that frustrates the statute’s purposes.38
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that prohibiting class arbitration will deprive some plaintiffs
the ability to bring their statutory claim altogether, because no “rational lawyer” would represent
individual claimants who are only owed small-dollar damages.39 Breyer’s rationale resembles language
from the Court’s earlier decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, which established
that statutory claims could be properly arbitrated so long as the litigant could still effectively pursue
their cause of action.40 Like Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion, Mitsubishi seemed to contemplate situations
where waivers within arbitration agreements could eventually render the agreements unenforceable.
Two years after Concepcion, a related class action decision addressed the question of
Mitsubishi’s “effective vindication” language directly, holding that so long as plaintiffs retained the
right to pursue a statutory claim, they were not entitled to any additional right to do so affordably.41
The Court found that plaintiffs bringing claims against a credit card merchant had no right to proceed
as a class, even though the high cost of expert analysis necessary for each claim and the meager sums
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-
consumer-class-actions/ (predicting that Conception could “spell the death-knell of consumer class actions”).
34 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
35 Id. at 344.
36 Id. at 348.
37 See id. at 352 (“Because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress,’ California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the FAA.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
38 See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L. J. 1217, 1242–44
(2013) (identifying how courts cite to Concepcion to compel arbitration over conflicting state law).
39 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
40 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (“And so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”). The decision included
a footnote stating that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.” Id. at 637 n.19.
41 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–37 (2013).
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available for recovery made class arbitration the only economically viable option.42 The five to four
majority relied on Concepcion, and once again allowed class action waivers within arbitration
agreements to be enforced.43
These cases show an unmistakable pattern of the Supreme Court ruling against class action
protections and in support of expansive arbitration agreements. This trend led Justice Kagan to
remark that the Court is subverting the goals of the FAA and allowing arbitration to “insulate
wrongdoers from liability.”44 Equating the Court to a hammer in search of a nail, Kagan emphasized
the majority’s ceaseless attempts to stamp out procedural protections.45 In contrast to the Supreme
Court, however, the Ninth Circuit has offered a path forward, repeatedly refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements that constrain the rights of employees and consumers.46
2. The Ninth Circuit’s complexity distinction
In a pair of arbitration decisions decided after Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit upheld state rules
regulating arbitration in a manner it held to accord with both the FAA and Supreme Court precedent.
While acknowledging the fact that class protections within arbitration are no longer viable after
Concepcion,47 the Ninth Circuit now preserves plaintiffs’ right to bring Private Attorney General Act
(“PAGA”) actions and public injunctions against corporations.48 Under California law, a private
attorney general action authorizes employees to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves, other
employees, and the state for violations of California’s labor code.49 This type of action allows multiple
employees to recover from the same defendant through a single action. Similarly, under California
law, a claim for a public injunction permits a single plaintiff to enjoin defendants engaging in unlawful
acts that threaten the public as a whole.50 Both types of claims provide viable checks against
42 Id. at 231.
43 Id. at 238–39. This case dismissed as dicta the footnote in Mitsubishi reading a guarantee of effective vindication of
claims into the FAA. Id. at 235 n.2. After Italian Colors, the Court firmly established that, while plaintiffs have the right to
pursue their claims through arbitration, they did not have the right to procedural elements like class arbitration that would
allow them to do so in an economically feasible manner. Id. at 237 n.4.
44 Id. at 253 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 252 (“To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule
23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”).
46 See, e.g., Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 Fed. Appx. 670 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019); Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Laster v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). But
see Dorman v. Charles Schwab Corp., 934 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (invoking Italian Colors to overturn Ninth Circuit precedent
and rule in favor of enforcing arbitration).
47 See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 433 (9th Cir. 2015) (conceding that the Court in
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted the California rule making class waivers unenforceable).
48 See id. at 440 (“We have held that the waiver of Sakkab’s representative PAGA claims may not be enforced.”); Blair
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the FAA does not preempt the California rule
making waivers of the right to seek a public injunction unenforceable).
49 Dep’t of Indus. Rels., State of California, Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) – Filing (Dec. 2020),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act/Private-Attorneys-General-Act.html [https://perma.cc/Y3QL-Q4
PC].




corporate abuse and, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, are beyond the reach of restrictive arbitration
agreements.
In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., the plaintiff brought a PAGA claim in
California state court against his employer, alleging the company unlawfully withheld wages from him
and his fellow employees.51 Although the arbitration agreement signed by all employees waived the
use of “representative actions,” the Ninth Circuit held that a California state court rule invalidating
such waivers did not frustrate the purposes of the FAA, meaning the waiver would likely be
unenforceable on remand.52
Distinguishing this case from Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit explained that, while procedural
complexity inherent in class action suits may frustrate the purposes of arbitration under the FAA,
complexity flowing from the substance of a claim itself does not frustrate arbitration in the same way.53
In Sakkab, the court contrasted PAGA claims and other substantively complex actions like antitrust
claims with procedurally complex class actions.54 The substantive complexity in PAGA actions, the
court found, comes from the manner in which the defendant’s liability is measured, while the
procedural complexity in class actions comes from the need to protect the due process rights of
absent parties.55 Accordingly, the court permitted the employee-protecting provision to survive the
weight of Concepcion and set a precedent through which state arbitration rules can survive federal
preemption.
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit decided a similar case pertaining to public injunctive relief
in the consumer arbitration context. In Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the plaintiff sought a public
injunction to prevent Rent-A-Center from extorting consumers through rent-to-own contracts in
violation of California state law.56 Although the plaintiff was bound by an arbitration agreement
forbidding her from seeking relief that would affect other Rent-A-Center account holders, the Ninth
Circuit found a California Supreme Court rule declaring such waivers unenforceable to not be
preempted by the FAA.57
Citing Sakkab, the Ninth Circuit applied the same substantive versus procedural distinction
primarily ‘resolve[s] a private dispute’ between the parties and ‘rectif[ies] individual wrongs’, and that benefits the public, if at
all, only incidentally” and public injunctive relief “that ‘by and large’ benefits the general public and that benefits the plaintiff,
‘if at all,’ only ‘incidental[ly]’ and/or as ‘a member of the general public’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 76 (Cal. 1999)).
51 803 F.3d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 2015).
52 Id. at 431–33; see Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 149 (Cal. 2014).
53 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 438.
54 Id. at 437–38; see also id. at 435 (“The class action is a procedural device for resolving the claims of absent parties on
a representative basis. By contrast, a PAGA action is a statutory action in which the penalties available are measured by the
number of Labor Code violations committed by the employer.”) (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 438, 442 (“[T]he potential complexity of PAGA actions is a direct result of how an employer’s liability is
measured under the statute. The amount of penalties an employee may recover is measured by the number of violations an
employer has committed, and the violations may involve multiple employees. . . . ‘[C]lass arbitration requires procedural
formality.’ For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representatives must at all times adequately
represent absent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt
out of the class.”) (citation omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011)).
56 Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2019).
57 Blair, 928 F.3d 822; see alsoMcGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 93 (Cal. 2017).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 3 (2021)
422
to find that any complexity resulting from public injunctive relief flowed from the kind of substantive
complexity characterizing PAGA claims and not the procedural complexity inherent in class actions.58
Accordingly, the court extended Sakkab’s holding and its carve-out from Concepcion to public
injunctive relief and consumer arbitration.
Against the backdrop of Supreme Court precedent preserving the power of employers,
companies, and their arbitration agreements, the Ninth Circuit’s recent holdings may appear as
momentary aberrations. But in spite of the odds, the carefully crafted legal arguments in Sakkab and
Blair appear to conform with the language of the FAA and Concepcion, and could spark a revolution in
employee and consumer arbitration jurisprudence if adopted by courts nationwide.
C. The Limitations of Alternate Solutions to Mandatory Arbitration
While courts and legislatures have attempted to reign in the excesses of mandatory
arbitration at the state level, federal lawmakers and grassroots activists have also puzzled over ways to
limit the prevalence of arbitration agreements. These groups have pursued legislative reforms at the
federal level and engaged in direct action against companies that mandate arbitral proceedings.
Although these approaches have seen some success, they also face significant obstacles.
In September 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Federal Arbitration
Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act.59 The Act would invalidate arbitration agreements in the consumer,
employment, antitrust, and civil rights contexts.60 Since these targeted categories contain the highest
incidences of bias and harm,61 the Act could provide immense relief to those most negatively
impacted by mandatory arbitration.62 Unfortunately, the Senate is unlikely to enact the bill due to
partisan division in the bill’s support.63 Despite current Democratic control of the Senate, the bill
would need to garner at least sixty votes to overcome a Senate filibuster, requiring significant
bipartisan support.64 These political obstacles limit the likelihood of an expeditious federal solution to
58 Blair, 928 F.3d at 828.
59 Andrew Kragie, House Dems Pass Limits on Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, LAW360 (Sept. 20, 2019, 6:56 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1200881/house-dems-pass-limits-on-mandatory-arbitration-clauses [https://perma.cc/WJ
K2-8M5G]. See generally H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
60 Kragie, supra note 59.
61 See supra Section I.A.
62 Contra Kragie, supra note 59 (quoting Republican Senator John Cornyn as saying the proposal would be “a gift to
trial lawyers” and that “[w]hat citizens need is an inexpensive and quick way to resolve disputes. Arbitration is one way to do
that.”).
63 See Alexia Fernández Campbell, The House Just Passed a Bill That Would Give Millions of Workers the Right to Sue Their
Boss, VOX (Sept. 20, 2019, 11:30 A.M.), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/20/20872195/forced-mandatory-arbitration-
bill-fair-act [https://perma.cc/7EZA-B76D] (describing how the bill may face resistance from Senate Republicans); see 165
CONG. REC. H7852 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2019) (reporting that only two out of 199 House Republicans, Congressman Matt
Gaetz (R-FL) and Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ), voted in favor of the bill).
64 See Philip Bump, Calls to End the Filibuster Have Bigger Problems Than Joe Manchin, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2021, 11:30
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/08/calls-end-filibuster-have-bigger-problems-than-joe-manchin/
[https://perma.cc/GF6V-NQBL]; Robert Iafolla & Louis C. LaBrecque, Democratic Edge in Senate Opens Narrow Path for





the discrimination perpetrated against workers and consumers through the arbitration process,
suggesting the need for a more immediate alternative.
Over the past few years, organizations of workers and students engaging in direct action
across the country have offered one such solution. The People’s Parity Project, an organization of
lawyers and law students committed to promoting fairness in the legal profession, champions issues
ranging from ending forced arbitration to protecting law clerks from workplace harassment and
abuse.65 Among other achievements, the People’s Parity Project was closely involved with a successful
push to drive multiple law firms to strike mandatory arbitration provisions from their employment
agreements.66 The group has also successfully lobbied the National Association for Law Placement to
include information about law firms’ internal arbitration policies in its published legal career
directory.67 Organizations like the People’s Parity Project are indispensable elements in the effort to
end forced arbitration, and their continued advocacy will no doubt lead to lasting change for many
employees and consumers.
Similar direct action has also led to concessions from employers in the tech world, where
workers at Google, Riot Games, and others have demanded an end to forced arbitration
agreements.68 These protests originated as part of #MeToo walkouts denouncing the use of
arbitration in sexual harassment and assault cases and have spread to these companies’ use of
arbitration agreements generally.69 In response to this persistent activism, Google has ended its use of
forced arbitration in employment agreements and now permits class action employment suits.70
Yet, while this movement has led to undeniable improvements for some employees, recent
successes fall short of broad reform. While Google’s full-time employees were released from their
65 See Karen Sloan, Shaking Up Big Law, Harvard-Founded Student Group Goes National, AM. LAW. (June 25, 2019, 2:29
PM), https://www.law.com/2019/06/25/shaking-up-big-law-harvard-founded-student-group-goes-national/ [https://perma.
cc/R98F-6CVM]. See generally PEOPLE’S PARITY PROJECT, https://www.peoplesparity.org [https://www.peoplesparity.org]
(advocating for, inter alia, worker rights, consumer rights, and the rights of victims of sexual harassment, with a particular focus
on ending forced arbitration) (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
66 See Samantha Stokes, Another Law Firm Abandons Mandatory Arbitration as Pressure Continues, AM. LAW. (Sept. 19,
2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/09/19/another-firm-abandons-mandatory-arbitration-as-
pressure-continues/ [https://perma.cc/98BD-LJLA].
67 See Caroline Spiezio, In Brief: NALP to List Law Firms’ Arbitration Info in Directory, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2019, 5:40 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-legal-nalp-arbitration/in-brief-nalp-to-list-law-firms-arbitration-info-in-directory-
idUSL1N28D1U4 [https://perma.cc/H9P3-5SAS] (discussing the People’s Parity Project’s advocacy efforts for NALP to
publicly list information about law firms’ arbitration practices).
68 See Sam Dean, Riot Games Workers Walk Out to Protest Forced Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Suits, L.A. TIMES (May 6,
2019, 1:37 P.M.), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-riot-games-walkout-protest-forced-arbitration-
20190506-story.html [https://perma.cc/J43V-3DPS] (describing collective action by Riot Games employees forced the
company to end its practice of requiring mandatory arbitration for newly hired employees bringing sexual misconduct claims);
Nitasha Tiku, Tech Workers Unite to Fight Forced Arbitration, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/tech-workers-unite-fight-forced-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/S4GG-CCZD] (discussing
collective action by Google employees to end forced arbitration).
69 See Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy After Employee Walkout, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/technology/google-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/93RA-MECL].
70 See Nitasha Tiku, Google Ends Forced Arbitration After Employee Protest, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2019, 6:59 P.M.),
https://www.wired.com/story/google-ends-forced-arbitration-after-employee-protest/ [https://perma.cc/QLE5-CSEJ].
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forced arbitration agreements, it took an additional stockholder derivative lawsuit for Alphabet,
Google’s parent company, to extend the change to its broader workforce.71 Further, Google has
begun firing labor organizers throughout the company, a response that has drawn significant scrutiny
from organizers and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).72 Workplace-by-workplace
action is a bold and necessary practice that should continue, but employer resistance and resource
constraints will likely hold back a definitive end to forced arbitration.
In light of the substantial obstacles and limitations to federal and grassroots action
impacting mandatory arbitration, this Article takes the position that dedicated state action is the
broadest and most feasible solution. Aided by the Ninth Circuit’s analytical distinction between
substantive and procedural complexity in the Sakkab and Blair decisions, states are in the best
position to enact laws that curtail the impact of arbitration agreements and ensure immediate and
major protections for workers and consumers.73
II. THE VIABILITY OF THE COMPLEXITY DISTINCTION
While the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FAA and Concepcion presents an attractive
avenue for states looking to combat forced arbitration without risking federal preemption, success in
other circuits will depend on bringing arguments in line with nationwide precedent. This Part begins
in Section A by evaluating the complexity distinction’s compatibility with two Supreme Court
decisions relied on by the Ninth Circuit in Sakkab and Blair. Section B then incorporates related
decisions issued after the Ninth Circuit’s development of this interpretation, examining how these
latter cases may further complicate the analysis. Finally, Section C expands to federal precedent
nationwide and assesses the interpretation’s likelihood of adoption in other circuits.
71 See id. (noting that the 2019 policy changes would not apply to “Google’s army of temporary employees,
contractors, and vendors”); Alaina Lancaster, Google Ends Mandatory Arbitration in $310M Sexual Harassment Settlement, THE
RECORDER (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/09/25/google-ends-mandatory-arbitration-in-310m-
sexual-harassment-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/DE5U-EFXB]. This type of differentiated treatment is emblematic of a
broader trend in the tech industry where companies avoid classifying workers as employees so that they may decrease their
level of guaranteed benefits. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTREDAME L. REV. 661,
666−67 (2013) (identifying statutory protections afforded to employees but not independent contractors); Shannon Bond,
California Voters Give Uber, Lyft a Win But Some Drivers Aren’t So Sure, NPR (Nov. 5, 2020, 6:01 A.M.), https://www.npr.
org/2020/11/05/931561150/california-voters-give-uber-lyft-a-win-but-some-drivers-arent-so-sure [https://perma.cc/MHK3-
7PH4] (explaining how a recently enacted California measure codifies the distinction between employees and contractors in the
gig economy).
72 See Greg Bensinger, Another Fired Google Engineer Alleges Retaliation for Union Activity, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019,
9:00 A.M.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/17/google-fires-fifth-engineer-who-alleges-retaliation-
union-activity/ [https://perma.cc/P9BJ-9N4U]; Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Fires 4 Workers Active in Labor
Organizing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/technology/google-fires-workers.html
[https://perma.cc/L8QR-PYJ5]; Tom Spiggle, The NLRB Accuses Google of Retaliating Against Workers Trying to Improve Their
Working Conditions, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2020, 3:49 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2020/12/09/the-nlrb-
accuses-google-of-retaliating-against-workers-trying-to-improve-their-working-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/YDA9-9UDE].




A. The Complexity Distinction Is Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent
1. Concepcion’s application of FAA preemption specifically targets procedural complexity
The Ninth Circuit’s Sakkab and Blair decisions maintain that the FAA only preempts laws
that increase the procedural complexity of arbitration, like the one mandating class action protections in
Concepcion, and not those that may increase the substantive complexity of arbitration, like rules
forbidding contractual waiver of PAGA claims in Sakkab or public injunctive relief in Blair. This
assertion is both a reasonable interpretation of Concepcion’s view of FAA preemption and was directly
contemplated in Conception itself.
Given that Concepcion ultimately pertains to a question of federal preemption of state law, it is
necessary to examine how the case frames the FAA’s preemptive power. In Concepcion, the Court
proposed a two-step analysis to evaluate FAA preemption.74 First, a court must determine whether
the state law is eligible for protection under the FAA’s savings clause by identifying whether it is a
“generally applicable contract defense.”75 A law found to target arbitration directly would fail this
step.76 Second, the court evaluates whether the law is applied in a manner that disfavors arbitration.77
This determination is largely based on whether the law stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of
facilitating informal, streamlined proceedings.78
In order for the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between substantive and procedural complexity
to conform with Concepcion’s view of FAA preemption, substantively complex claims must pass the
second step of this analysis, i.e., they must not obstruct the FAA’s interest in efficient proceedings.79
In Concepcion, the Court presented three additional factors to determine if state protections obstruct
the purposes of the FAA: (i) whether the law will sacrifice the informality of arbitration by making it
slower and more costly; (ii) whether the law increases the procedural formalities required at
arbitration; and (iii) whether the law causes an increased risk to the defendant.80 While the Court in
Concepcion found that laws mandating the right to class action procedures failed on all three points,81
74 See Lisa Tripp & Evan R. Hanson, AT&T v. Concepcion: The Problem of a False Majority, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1, 6 (2013) (discussing how Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Concepcion first addresses rules that prohibit arbitration and are
clearly preempted, and then turns to the more difficult issue of facially neutral rules that frustrate the purposes of the FAA).
75 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
76 Id. at 341; see, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (holding the FAA preempted a Montana statute because the law
“condition[ed] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a . . . requirement not applicable to contracts
generally”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (reversing a California state court decision that relied on a state law allowing
plaintiffs to disregard arbitration agreements when bringing actions to collect wages); Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733
F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a decision that exempted all claims of public injunctive relief from arbitration).
77 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341.
78 See id. at 344. The Court specifically poses two hypotheticals to explain this step of the analysis: (i) a state rule
demanding arbitration contain judicially-monitored discovery, and (ii) a state rule demanding arbitration include a final decision
by a jury (or as Scalia proposes, “a panel of twelve lay arbitrators”). Id. at 341–42. These two scenarios would not be explicitly
aimed at arbitration, but their effects would have a disproportionate impact on such procedures. See id. at 342.
79 See id. at 348–51; contra Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 441–42 (9th Cir. 2015) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
80 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348−51.
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other laws creating only substantive complexity will likely fare better under the same analysis.
When the Court in Concepcion discussed how class protections make arbitrations slower and
more costly, it specified that such procedures require an arbitrator to decide whether the class should
be certified, whether the named parties were sufficiently representative of the broader class, and how
discovery for the class should be conducted.82 The substantively complex PAGA claims at issue in
Sakkab, however, have none of the same procedural requirements mandated by Rule 23 for class
actions.83 The dissenting opinion in Sakkab argued that, nevertheless, the substantively complex
PAGA claims still increase the procedural formalities required at arbitration and slow the process by
requiring an arbitrator to make fact-intensive judgments about absent parties.84 The same argument
could be made against Blair’s claims for public injunctive relief in which a defendant must account for
the money obtained from consumers and notify these consumers of their statutory rights.85
The difference between these claims and the class procedures addressed in Concepcion is that
any added complexity in substantively complex claims is introduced after the arbitrator has already
ruled on the legal questions at issue.86 That is, in PAGA and public injunctive disputes, the added
complexity facing the arbitrator is limited to determining the remedial actions required of the
defendant. This distinction is important because Concepcion specifically focused on how the disruption
of arbitration’s bilateral nature—the fact that it is adjudicated between just two parties—distorts the
objectives of the FAA.87 Both PAGA claims and claims for public injunctive relief maintain the
81 See id. The breadth of the Court’s holding has engendered significant dissent from commentators. See, e.g., Willy E.
Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for Unsophisticated Consumers and Employees’ Contractual Rights? – Legal and Empirical Analyses of
Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systemic Erosion of Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 1800 – 2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 225 (2016) (“[T]he Concepcion Court’s conclusions are not well
grounded in sound or statistically significant evidence. . . . [E]ven if simple percentages were powerful predictors, the reported
percentages and statistically significant bivariate relationships in the present study do not support the Concepcion Court’s general
conclusion.”); Tripp & Hanson, supra note 74, at 2 (arguing that Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Concepcion rejects the second
step of Scalia’s preemption analysis, therefore depriving the Court of a majority behind the reasoning of its holding).
82 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348.
83 See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 436 (“In a PAGA action, the court does not inquire into the named plaintiff’s and class
counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent unnamed employees. . . . Moreover, unlike Rule 23(a), PAGA contains no
requirements of numerosity, commonality, or typicality.”).
84 See id. at 444–46 (Smith, J., dissenting) (explaining that the arbitrator would need to determine the number of
parties affected by the labor code violation and the number of pay periods during which they were affected).
85 See Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiffs seek a ‘public injunction’ on behalf of
the people of California to enjoin future violations of these laws, and to require that Rent-A-Center provide an accounting of
monies obtained from California consumers and individualized notice to those consumers of their statutory rights.”).
86 Compare Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349 (“For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class
representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class.”), with Blair, 928 F.3d at 830 (demonstrating that the responsibility
of arbitrators to consider the interests of the public as a whole is not unique to public injunctions because arbitrators routinely
consider such interests when issuing private injunctions), and Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 438 (“[T]he potential complexity of PAGA
actions is a direct result of how an employer’s liability is measured under the statute. The amount of penalties an employee may
recover is measured by the number of violations an employer has committed, and the violations may involve multiple
employees.”).
87 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (“[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of





bilateral nature of arbitration and therefore do not sacrifice informality or increase procedural
formality in the manner envisioned by the majority in Concepcion.88
Because the stakes of an arbitration vary across claims and contexts, it is difficult to imagine
that the Court’s remaining point regarding the level of risk to defendants can carry much weight on
its own. While not addressed directly in Blair, the Sakkab court responded to this concern, contending
that state protections for remedies cannot be preempted solely on the level of risk they may pose to
defendants.89 Further, the Ninth Circuit suggests that parties can always prospectively decide to
litigate high-stakes claims as many do in the antitrust context.90 While this argument is internally
consistent on its own, it is further supported by Supreme Court precedent establishing that arbitration
agreements cannot bar substantive rights afforded by statute.91
2. The complexity distinction is necessary to reconcile Supreme Court precedent
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth92 places an
important limitation on Concepcion. In the former case, the Supreme Court held that parties entering
into agreements to arbitrate statutory claims do not forgo the substantive rights afforded by those
statutes.93 According to the Court, an agreement to arbitrate does nothing more than move a claim
from a judicial to an arbitral forum, trading the additional procedures of a courtroom for the
simplicity of arbitration.94 In light of this holding, Concepcion’s preemption analysis must be limited and
cannot be deployed in a manner that would deny a party’s substantive rights as provided by law.95 In
the context of the laws at issue in Sakkab and Blair, this means that the guarantees to pursue PAGA
88 See Blair, 928 F.3d at 829 (“Crucially, arbitration of a public injunction does not interfere with the bilateral nature of
a typical consumer arbitration.”); Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 436 (“Nothing prevents parties from agreeing to use informal procedures
to arbitrate representative PAGA claims.”).
89 See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 437 (“[T]he FAA would not preempt a state statutory cause of action . . . merely because
the action’s high stakes would arguably make it poorly suited to arbitration.”). The court specifically cites Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
in arguing that concepts of federalism lead to the presumption that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action.” Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Similarly, the court cites Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.
where it was assumed that a term in an arbitration agreement barring punitive damages was not enforceable. Id. (citing Booker
v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
90 Id. at 437–38.
91 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
92 Id. at 614.
93 Id. at 628.
94 Id.
95 Although the Court in Concepcion contends that the FAA preempts state laws that interfere with its objective of
facilitating informal, streamlined proceedings, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011), the Court in
Mitsubishi ensures that this preemption cannot limit a plaintiff’s right to pursue substantive statutory rights. See Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 628. It must be noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit does not agree with this interpretation of Mitsubishi and has
indicated support for Justice Kagan’s dissenting view in Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting), that Mitsubishi does not apply to state statutes. Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 936
(9th Cir. 2013). Despite this disagreement, a majority of the Court in Italian Colors treated Mitsubishi as applying to state as well
as federal statutes. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238 (stating that in Concepcion, a case involving a state statute, the Court “specifically
rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal
system’” and therefore applied the analysis in Mitsubishi to a state statute) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351).
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claims and public injunctive relief cannot be eliminated through FAA preemption.
Even if the Court in Concepcion did not contemplate a distinction between substantive and
procedural complexity itself, a limitless application of FAA preemption would veer too close to
upsetting the holding in Mitsubishi, which has been specifically endorsed in cases following
Concepcion.96 As the Court in Mitsubishi stated, “potential complexity should not suffice to ward off
arbitration,”97 and arbitrators are sufficiently competent adjudicators to consider and manage
substantively complex cases.
Between a straightforward reading of Concepcion and the need to harmonize Concepcion and
Mitsubishi, the Ninth Circuit’s safe harbor for substantively complex claims is a fair interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent. In order for the complexity distinction in Sakkab and Blair to remain
viable across all federal courts, however, it is necessary that it accords with Supreme Court precedent
decided after these Ninth Circuit cases.
B. The Complexity Distinction Is Consistent with Post-Concepcion Jurisprudence
1. Epic Systems has no measurable effect on Sakkab
While some commentators and courts have speculated that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis98 may cast doubt on the Court’s acceptance of the Ninth Circuit’s
complexity distinction, their arguments fail to do more than appeal to the Court’s favorable view of
arbitration.99 In Epic Systems, the Court interpreted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as not
guaranteeing a right to class and collective action in arbitration proceedings.100 The Court employed
several canons of statutory construction to determine that there was no right in the NLRA that would
cause it to conflict with the FAA.101 In an order from the Southern District of California, the judge
inquired as to whether Sakkab remained good law after Epic Systems and whether the California law in
Sakkab may be preempted by the FAA.102 Other courts within the circuit disagreed with this
assessment, with one opinion calling the Southern District’s argument “conclusory” and
96 See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236 (“[The Mitsubishi exception to arbitration enforceability] would certainly cover a
provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”).
97 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633.
98 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
99 See, e.g., Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for Mandatory Arbitration After
Epic, New Prime, and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 815, 845 (2019). Note, however, that this article does not give a specific
reason why the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would be at risk after Epic Systems, except for a broad argument concerning the
Court’s favorability toward arbitration. Id.
100 Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1628.
101 See, e.g., id. at 1626–27 (explaining that Congress “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes”); id. at 1630 (arguing
that courts should resist reading conflicts into statutes).
102 See McGovern v. United States Bank N.A., 362 F. Supp. 3d 850, 862 n.5 (S.D. Cal. 2019). (“If a federal law . . .
that applies regardless of the existence of an arbitration provision does not implicate the FAA’s saving clause to avoid
preemption, presumably a state law . . . that applies regardless of the existence of an arbitration provision does not implicate





The Ninth Circuit gave a conclusive answer to its view of Epic Systems’s effect on Sakkab
when it returned to its complexity distinction in Blair. The court distinguished Epic Systems from the
facts in Blair, concluding that the bilateral nature of arbitration remains undisturbed by the
substantive right to seek public injunctive relief.104 The court did not comment directly on Epic
Systems’s potential impact on Sakkab, but the opinion implied a lack of conflict by treating Sakkab’s
complexity distinction as good law.105
In Blair, the defendant alleged a conflict between Sakkab and Epic Systems, arguing that the
Supreme Court remained hostile to rules that interfere with enforcing the terms of an arbitration
agreement.106 In a similar manner to the Southern District of California,107 the defendant failed to
offer further explanation for why these two cases were specifically incompatible.108
In sum, Epic Systems does not seem to pose any additional challenge to the Ninth Circuit’s
complexity distinction beyond strengthening a heuristic presumption that the Supreme Court will
uphold the terms of most arbitration agreements. While the Court’s affection for arbitration is
manifest, there is not at present any coherent legal argument suggesting that Epic Systems conflicts
with the holdings in either Sakkab or Blair.
2. Rejections of petitions for certiorari have not implicated the complexity distinction
While lower courts have at times appeared eager to discuss the viability of the Ninth
Circuit’s complexity distinction, the Supreme Court has had decidedly less to say.109 Despite
numerous petitions for certiorari on cases related to the representative actions addressed in Sakkab
and Blair, no petitions have been granted, and no dissents from the denial of certiorari have been
published. Although the Court has emphatically disputed that such denials express any opinion on the
merits of these cases,110 it is worth briefly examining the parties’ arguments for why the underlying
jurisprudence does or does not deserve further review.
While neither party in Sakkab submitted petitions for certiorari, and Blair was settled out of
court,111 two Ninth Circuit cases addressing similar representative actions have been briefed and
103 See Echevarria v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-04041-BLF, 2019 WL 2503377, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2019).
104 Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 829 (9th Cir. 2019).
105 See id. at 825 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion and our decision in Sakkab guide our analysis. Indeed,
our decision in Sakkab all but decides this case.”).
106 See Reply Brief for Rent-A-Center at 7, Blair, 928 F.3d 819 (No. 17-17221).
107 See McGovern, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 862 n.5.
108 See Reply Brief for Rent-A-Center, supra note 107, at 10.
109 The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions to decide whether the FAA preempts the individual state rule
at issue in Sakkab itself. See Delisle v. Speedy Cash, No. 3:18-CV-2042-GPC-RBB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96981, at *36 n. 3
(S.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has been asked to weigh in on whether the FAA preempts Iskanian on
many occasions; each time it denied certiorari.”).
110 See Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950) (“[I]t simply means that fewer than four
members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter of sound judicial discretion.”);
United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) (“The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the
merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.”).
111 Importantly, although Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. has been settled outside of court, its two companion cases,
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petitioned to the Supreme Court.112 Both cases involved employees seeking civil penalties and unpaid
wages from the same employer on behalf of themselves and their coworkers under California’s
PAGA law.113 After losing at the Ninth Circuit, the defendants in both cases petitioned for Supreme
Court review, arguing that PAGA claims should be preempted by the FAA.
Two common points across both petitions were that: (i) the California PAGA law is not a
rule of general applicability;114 and (ii) PAGA claims frustrate the bilateral nature of arbitration.115 An
amicus brief from members of the business community additionally emphasized the “deluge” of
PAGA claims following Sakkab and argued the increase was a matter of significant practical
importance.116 While the business community may be correct that the increase in PAGA claims will
accentuate the stakes of future petitions for Supreme Court review, the other two arguments
advanced by the petitioners are unlikely to hold up under scrutiny.
Regarding the first step of Concepcion’s preemption analysis,117 a law applying to all contracts,
whether or not they pertain to arbitration, should be classified as a per se generally applicable rule.118
Laws that fail at this step in the analysis generally target arbitration directly as opposed to disfavoring
it in application, and a rule forbidding PAGA waivers does not apply differently to arbitration than it
does to any other contract.119 Further, the petitioners’ contention that the California rule forbidding
PAGA waivers has only ever been used to invalidate arbitration contracts is less a showing that the
rule is not generally applicable and more a reflection on the propensity for arbitration agreements to
deny plaintiff protections compared with other contracts.120 The fact that parties generally allow
McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 772 F. App’x 575 (9th Cir. 2019), and Tillage v. Comcast Corp., 772 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir.
2019), may be reheard en banc. Daniel P. Pascucci, Waiving Claims for Public Injunctive Relief in California Arbitration Agreements: The
McGill Rule on Appeal, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/waiving-claims-public-injunctive-
relief-california-arbitration-agreements-mcgill [https://perma.cc/7NTK-N4JG]. The outcome of the rehearing of these
companion cases will be an important indicator of the potential for a certiorari petition being granted in the future.
112 See Mandviwala v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc., 723 F. App’x 415 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2680 (2018);
Lefevre v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc., 705 F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 68 (2018).
113 See Mandviwala, 723 F. App’x at 416; Lefevre, 705 F. App’x at 622.
114 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Five Star Senior Living Inc. v. Lefevre, 139 S. Ct. 68 (2018) (No. 17-1470)
[hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lefevre]; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Five Star Senior Living, Inc. v.
Mandviwala, 138 S. Ct. 2680 (2018) (No. 17-1357) [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mandyiwala]. Note that if this
were true, the law would not pass step one of Concepcion’s preemption analysis. See supra Section II.A.1.
115 See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 9–10, Mandviwala, 138 S. Ct. 2680 (No. 17-1357) (arguing that bilateral arbitration
in which one party is acting as a representative for other parties is not the sort of bilateral arbitration envisioned by the Court
in Concepcion).
116 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 18–19, Mandviwala, 138 S. Ct. 2680 (No. 17-1357) (“Representative PAGA actions have flooded California’s state
and federal courts in the wake of Iskanian and Sakkab, as enterprising plaintiffs and their counsel seek to evade this Court’s
decision in Concepcion and end-run their otherwise binding agreements to arbitrate employment-related claims on an individual
basis.”).
117 See supra Section II.A.1.
118 See generally Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 432–33 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that
Concepcion took a broad view of the scope of the FAA’s Savings Clause, and with it the determination of which rules were
generally applicable).
119 See, e.g., supra note 76.




PAGA restrictions in settlement agreements is equally unresponsive to the question because
settlements are profoundly distinct from original proceedings, whether civil or arbitral.121
The second argument, that the California rule frustrates the bilateral nature of arbitration,
has already been thoroughly and convincingly addressed in the Ninth Circuit’s decisions.122 The Ninth
Circuit has concluded that PAGA actions remain bilateral throughout their proceedings and only
consider absent parties once the arbitrator has reached a legal conclusion and is calculating
remedies.123
Notably, neither petition included arguments targeting the Ninth Circuit’s complexity
distinction directly.124 While far from conclusive, this observation supports the general proposition
that, even if the individual rules at issue in Sakkab and Blair could be preempted on other grounds in
some future case, there do not seem to be any legal arguments that can convincingly target the logic
of the Ninth Circuit’s complexity distinction itself.125
C. The Complexity Distinction Is Consistent with Most Nationwide Precedent
1. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision in Joseph v. Quality Dining, Inc. is inapposite
While the Ninth Circuit’s complexity distinction seems to align with Supreme Court
precedent issued both before and after the cases where it was developed,126 an obstacle to the
interpretation’s nationwide adoption may have arisen in the unique caselaw of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. In Joseph v. Quality Dining, Inc., the District Court suggested that the substantive versus
procedural rights distinction may not be an impactful element of the FAA’s preemption analysis.127
The court determined that Mitsubishi does not prohibit arbitration agreements from eliminating a
plaintiff’s ability to pursue a substantive right. Instead, the court interpreted Mitsubishi’s language that
agreements to arbitrate do not cause a party to forgo substantive rights as a merely descriptive
statement as opposed to a mandatory instruction.128 From this analytical standpoint, the Court in
case or example outside the arbitration context in which the supposedly ‘generally applicable’ Iskanian rule has been applied.”).
121 See id. at 15–16 (“[T]he Iskanian rule is plainly not applied in all contractual contexts. For example, while under the
Iskanian rule employees may not waive representative PAGA claims in arbitration agreements, they may freely waive representative
PAGA claims in settlement agreements. Applicability to arbitration agreements, but not settlement agreements, was the precise fact
that this Court found to be ‘another indication’ that the disputed rule in Kindred impermissibly arose from the suspect status of
arbitration.”).
122 See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435; see also discussion supra Section II.A.1.
123 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435.
124 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lefevre, supra note 115, at 1; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Mandviwala, supra note 115, at 1.
125 The Ninth Circuit continues to assert that Sakkab has not been overruled by any subsequent Supreme Court
precedent. See Rivas v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., No. 20-55140, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 364, at *2–3 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2021) (“The
Supreme Court . . . reiterated and reapplied [Concepcion’s holding] in Epic Systems and Lamps Plus. But neither case expanded
upon Concepcion in such a way as to abrogate Sakkab.”).
126 See supra Sections II.A–B.
127 244 F. Supp. 3d 467, 474 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
128 See id. (“It is unreasonable to take the simple recognition that a party’s substantive rights afforded by a statute may
be equally enforced through court or arbitration and turn it into a key point of analysis mandating that ‘substantive rights’ as a
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Mitsubishi was commenting on a trend in arbitration agreements, not dictating how they must operate.
If the District Court is correct that Mitsubishi does not guarantee plaintiffs’ ability to pursue
statutorily granted substantive rights, the FAA’s preemptive power over state protections would go
unchecked, and any rule that guaranteed substantive or procedural rights would be preempted if it led
to any increased complexity in arbitration. Put differently, the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between
substantive and procedural complexity would be inapplicable, with all forms of complexity now
putting state regulation of arbitration at risk of preemption.
It seems likely, however, that further review should overturn Joseph. The decision has
generated little to no scholarly discussion, and the relevant passage has not been cited in any
subsequent case.129 Further, the language conflicts directly with Supreme Court precedent
acknowledging plaintiffs’ “right to pursue” statutory remedies.130 If the substantive complexity of
statutory claims could put their statutes at risk of preemption, the decision to arbitrate would have a
direct impact on a plaintiff’s ability to pursue a claim, in direct contrast to the Court’s directive in
Mitsubishi. A plaintiff attempting to cite the Ninth Circuit’s complexity distinction in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania may have some difficulty in distinguishing Joseph, but Joseph’s conflict with
Mitsubishi makes it highly unlikely that a future court would uphold the case if challenged.131
2. Support for the complexity distinction is found in the pre-Epic Systems circuit split
While the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is unique in concluding that the distinction
between substantive and procedural rights has little impact on a preemption analysis under the FAA,
the potential for other jurisdictions to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between substantive and
procedural rights may depend on a previous circuit split that culminated in Epic Systems. (Recall that
this case held that the NLRA does not guarantee a right to class and collective action in arbitration
proceedings.132)
When the case was heard by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendant argued
that if the NLRA guaranteed a right to collective action, the right was procedural in nature rather than
substantive, and therefore it could not interfere with the FAA’s mandate to enforce a pre-dispute
arbitration clause barring class proceedings.133 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding
that the right to collective action was, in fact, a substantive right because it was at the heart of the
remedy that Congress was attempting to provide through the statute.134 On review, the Supreme
Court did not address whether the right to collective action was per se procedural or if it could be
category may not be affected by an agreement to arbitrate”).
129 The few cases that do cite to this decision do not specifically rely on its rejection of the substantive versus
procedural complexity distinction.
130 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–38 (2013) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
131 For a broader discussion on the interplay between the substantive and procedural aspects of federal law, see
generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH U. L. REV. 1027, 1032–33 (2013) (exploring a
growing trend of courts using cloaking efforts to target social ends with substantive consequences through restrictions on
mechanisms of procedure; a phenomenon arguably occurring in many of the arbitration decisions discussed in this Article).
132 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018); see supra Section II.B.1.





substantive, nor what effect this distinction may have. Instead, the Court held that the right to class
proceedings did not exist in the NLRA at all.135 On remand, the question of whether the right to class
proceedings is substantive or procedural was not taken up again, and the case was dismissed.136
In the wake of Epic Systems, many circuits have yet to determine whether the right to pursue
a claim on behalf of a collective group in laws other than the NLRA is a substantive or a procedural
right. Before Epic Systems, circuit courts were divided on this question. The Second and Fifth Circuits
held that the right to proceed on behalf of others was a mere procedural right,137 while the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits, as well as the NLRB, held that the right was substantive.138 As Epic Systems did not
settle this issue, the prior dividing lines between circuits may influence whether courts will view the
right for arbitration to affect absent parties (as it does in PAGA and public injunction claims) to be a
procedural right creating procedural complexity or a substantive right creating substantive complexity.
The analytical distinction very closely resembles the issue in Sakkab and Blair, and if PAGA or public
injunction statutes are tested in these circuits, these previous lines may predict correspondingly
disparate outcomes.
The Second and Fifth Circuits, holding that the right to a collective action is a procedural
right, analyzed this guarantee in the abstract, without considering whether the substantive or
procedural nature of such rights may depend on the different laws within which they were created.139
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and the NLRB looked at each statute individually and
differentiated those where the use of collective action was a substantive right from those where it was
a mere procedural device.140 The Seventh Circuit described the distinction succinctly, explaining that
“just because [a] . . . right is associational does not mean that it is not substantive. It would be odd
indeed to consider associational rights, such as the one guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, non-substantive.”141 In other words, the Seventh Circuit believed there was a right
to proceed collectively in the NLRA, and the fact that this right was associational did not require it to
be procedural. Insofar as courts in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere adopt this reasoning, they are
135 See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1628; Greene & O’Brien, supra note 100, at 823.
136 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-CV-82-BBC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11937, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019).
137 See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We have previously explained that
the procedural ‘right’ to proceed collectively presupposes, and does not create, a non-waivable, substantive right to bring such a
claim.”); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class action procedures, though, is not a
substantive right.”).
138 See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The rights established in § 7 of the
NLRA—including the right of employees to pursue legal claims together—are substantive. They are the central,
fundamental protections of the Act. . . .”); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160 (“The right to collective action in section 7 of the NLRA is
not, however, merely a procedural one. It instead lies at the heart of the restructuring of employer/employee relationships that
Congress meant to achieve in the statute.”); D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2286 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012) (“The right to
engage in collective action—including collective legal action—is the core substantive right protected by the NLRA and is the
foundation on which the Act and Federal labor policy rest.”).
139 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 357 (“For example, the Supreme Court has determined that there is no
substantive right to class procedures under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act despite the statute providing for class
procedures. Similarly, numerous courts have held that there is no substantive right to proceed collectively under the
FLSA. . . .”) (citations omitted); Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 (citing the same Supreme Court precedent).
140 See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161 (“It bears repeating: just as the NLRA is not Rule 23, it is not the ADEA or the FLSA.
While the FLSA and ADEA allow class or collective actions, they do not guarantee collective process.”).
141 Id. at 1161.
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likely to view the right to proceed on behalf of others in PAGA and public injunction statutes as
substantive and therefore sheltered from the threat of FAA preemption under the Ninth Circuit
framework.
It bears repeating that when the Supreme Court took up the cases consolidated in Epic
Systems, it did not determine whether the right to collective action was or was not substantive, only
that such a right was not guaranteed in the NLRA.142 Therefore, the present circuit split over this
issue could play a significant role in future applications of PAGA or public injunction statutes. For
those who view such a right to be substantive, adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Sakkab
and Blair—and the resulting protection for state laws curtailing arbitration—appears likely.
III. THE PROMISING POTENTIAL OF THE COMPLEXITY DISTINCTION
With the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between substantive and procedural complexity
appearing reasonably secure (at least on the merits), state legislatures should feel empowered to
examine what the application of this precedent throughout the country could mean for employee and
consumer protections.
Section A of this Part explores the types of laws that state legislatures could likely pass
without fear of preemption under the protection of Ninth Circuit precedent, Section B details the
types of laws that would likely still be preempted despite Ninth Circuit precedent, and Section C
examines the broader effect that such a rise in legislation could have on the practice of arbitration as a
whole.
A. Effective Applications of the Complexity Distinction
1. Enacting statutes to protect PAGA and public injunction claims
The most straightforward use of the Ninth Circuit’s cabined view of FAA preemption
would be for states to pass laws implementing PAGA claims and rights to public injunctions,
ensuring they could not be legally waived in any contract, including arbitration. This replication of the
California system would grant expanded opportunities for relief to workers and consumers across the
country by making otherwise daunting lawsuits economically viable. When the economic burdens of
pursuing relatively small remedies for labor violations can be spread among a larger group of parties,
the incentive to hold corporate abusers accountable increases significantly. An enforceable legal check
on corporations with otherwise immense bargaining power would benefit workers, consumers, and
the broader democratic public.
While PAGA laws have not yet been passed in any other states, bills have been proposed in
Oregon, New York, Illinois, and Vermont.143 With targeted activism and the spread of positive
142 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018).
143 See H.B. 2205, 2021 Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021); Empowering People in Rights Enforcement (EMPIRE)
Worker Protection Act, Assemb. 2265, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Empowering People in Rights Enforcement
(EMPIRE) Worker Protection Act, S. 1848, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Limitations on Forced Arbitration Act, S.
0983, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H. 789, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); see also Myriam Gilles, The
Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private Enforcement Solutions to Class Action Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2236–39




examples like California, state legislatures in all fifty states should introduce bills that both recognize
PAGA and public injunction claims and establish the waiver of these claims in arbitration to be
against public policy.
The pre-Epic Systems jurisprudence in some circuits likely presents the primary legal
limitation to state implementation, but even so, such precedent is far from a guaranteed obstacle to
state regulation. The precedent in the Second and Fifth Circuits primarily focuses on laws allowing
plaintiffs to proceed collectively or as a class and does not directly address the representative form of
proceedings present in PAGA and public injunction claims. Even if these circuits did have a
propensity to view assembly rights as more procedural than substantive, the differences between class
and representative actions may be sufficient for state laws to avoid FAA preemption.144 Under the
Sakkab and Blair precedents, a state should be able to avoid FAA preemption of state laws protecting
PAGA and public injunction claims as long as they can show that any added arbitral complexity
derives from a substantive element of their claim, as opposed to a procedural one.145 Within this
framework, the crux of a successful defense against preemption is to locate the complexity of PAGA
and public injunction claims in the remedies determination of the arbitration as opposed to the merits
stage.146
Although these types of statutes may not have protected Vanina Guerrero, ensuring the
viability of PAGA and public injunction claims outside of California would nonetheless strengthen
the Ninth Circuit’s complexity distinction across arbitration contexts. Were states to implement these
laws and survive FAA preemption under judicial review, it would be a positive signal for the growing
influence of the Ninth Circuit’s cabined view of FAA preemption. Early successes would present
opportunities for states to enact more stringent restrictions on the ability of arbitration agreements to
waive substantive rights, as well as generating more expansive guarantees for what employees and
consumers should expect in their arbitrations.
2. Enacting restrictions to arbitration confidentiality provisions
In addition to helping plaintiffs coordinate and bring small claims, the Sakkab and Blair
precedents may be able to cure the confidentiality problem at the heart of many arbitration
agreements. Arbitration gag rules prevent other victims from being emboldened to come forward and
future victims from being aware of the harmful behavior by a company or supervisor.147 Some
Bosses. New York Has Noticed, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2017, 5:00 A.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-
29/california-helps-workers-sue-their-bosses-new-york-has-noticed [https://perma.cc/8NL9-YGB2] (describing the spread of
PAGA laws across the country).
144 It is entirely possible that these circuits could view the right to class action proceedings in an arbitration as a
procedural right but view the right for one plaintiff to proceed through an arbitration individually while seeking remedies for
other parties as a substantive right.
145 See Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 829 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A state-law rule that preserves the right to
pursue a substantively complex claim in arbitration without mandating procedural complexity does not frustrate the FAA’s
objectives.”).
146 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
147 See, e.g., Wakabayashi & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 16 (recognizing that “because [harassment] claims are often
kept under wraps in confidential arbitration hearings . . . harassers often move easily to other jobs without warning to future
victims” and noting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has found “forced arbitration ‘can prevent employees
from learning about similar concerns shared by others in their work place.’”).
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commentators additionally worry about the difficulty of doctrinal development in a field where the
lion’s share of cases is decided behind closed doors.148 How can the contours of an evolving
jurisprudence take shape if each decision is private and discrete? Although some elements of
confidentiality may be ameliorated if a party seeks judicial confirmation of an arbitration award under
federal law, it is not necessarily the case that this will provide the sort of notice and awareness that
our legal system encourages for exposing wrongdoers.149
In response to arbitral gag rules that conceal credibly accused parties from findings of fault,
some states have proposed legislative solutions.150 California’s legislation, for instance, mandates that
parties disclose the matter at issue, the name of the nonconsumer party, the number of times the
nonconsumer party has appeared before the particular arbitration provider, and whether the
arbitration was demanded pursuant to a predispute clause.151 Some scholars speculate that the FAA
may preempt these types of laws outright.152 In light of Supreme Court precedent, their arguments are
well founded, as the laws at issue lack general applicability and can thus be said to “single out”
arbitration.153 If these laws are found to directly target arbitration, the Ninth Circuit’s complexity
distinction cannot save them when challenged on preemption grounds.154
While those specific attempts to curb arbitration gag rules may be preempted, application of
the Ninth Circuit’s cabined version of FAA preemption provides a more promising avenue for
diminishing the presence of confidentiality provisions. Since the Supreme Court has previously
alluded to a presumption of privacy and confidentiality in many bilateral arbitrations,155 some
defendants may claim that state abrogation of confidentiality interferes with a fundamental attribute
of arbitration and is therefore preempted by the FAA.156 Under the Ninth Circuit framework,
however, a law restricting confidentiality provisions would be an instance where a plaintiff could
gainfully employ the distinction between substance and procedure to avoid preemption concerns.
In order to successfully follow the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, states should be exceedingly
148 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 408–
09 (2016).
149 See generally 9 U.S.C § 13 (requiring the submission of the arbitration agreement, information regarding the
appointment of the arbitrator, and a statement of the award).
150 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2020); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430 (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010); MD. CODEANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011).
151 See CIV. PROC. § 1281.96(a).
152 See, e.g., Lampley, supra note 3, at 1764.
153 See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2017) (“Such a rule is too tailor-made
to arbitration agreements—subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to uncommon barriers—to survive the
FAA’s edict against singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.”). Note also that at least one commentator has
questioned whether arbitration as a field can be directly regulated by state legislatures at all. See Lampley, supra note 3, at 1764
n.188 (“The general import of the FAA is that arbitration agreements cannot be treated with more hostility than regular
contracts. But does that mean the State cannot regulate arbitration providers?”).
154 See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining how the first step of the FAA’s preemption analysis would immediately
preempt these laws).
155 See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
156 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (2018) (explaining that the FAA’s savings clause does not
provide shelter for state “defenses targeting arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods, such as by ‘interfer[ing] with




careful in drafting laws prohibiting confidentiality clauses. One Washington state law, for example, is
fairly reckless in this regard by placing the protected right in a decidedly procedural posture. The
statute reads that “[a] provision of an employment contract or agreement is against public policy and
is void and unenforceable . . . if it requires an employee to resolve claims of discrimination in a
dispute resolution process that is confidential.”157 By positioning the transparency of the process as the
protected right, the interference with the presumption of confidentiality flows from a procedural and
not a substantive element. Therefore, the law may fall outside the Ninth Circuit’s carveout and risks
preemption. Similarly, a New York law pertaining solely to discrimination claims establishes that “no
employer . . . shall have the authority to include . . . in any . . . agreement . . . any term or condition
that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or
action. . . .”158 Although it avoids a reference to its impact on dispute resolution procedures
themselves (unlike the Washington law), the New York law’s focus on restricting employer action, as
opposed to guaranteeing a substantive right to an employee, resembles a procedural restriction more
so than a substantive right. It is therefore still likely that such a law would face a serious FAA
preemption risk.
States could chart a safer course by modeling their legislation on a section of the NLRA that
has been interpreted as a substantive guarantee against forced confidentiality.159 The statute’s
language—”Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . “—is far closer to a substantive right
than a procedural restriction.160 According to the NLRB, Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’
right to discuss any sexual harassment complaints they have against employers,161 exchange the terms
of their wages,162 and bring complaints about their employment to the media.163 A recent NLRB
decision has further interpreted the NLRA to provide a substantive right that cannot be infringed by
arbitration confidentiality clauses.164 This decision is particularly relevant here, finding that the
substantive nature of the right distinguished it from the right rejected in Epic Systems.165 While the
judge’s reasoning draws an important distinction between procedural and substantive rights, the
opinion’s citation of Epic Systems is somewhat tenuous, as that decision did not address the
157 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.085 (West 2018).
158 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-b (MCKINNEY 2019).
159 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .”).
160 Id.
161 See Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510 (2002), enforced, 63 Fed. Appx. 524, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (invalidating a
confidentiality rule barring employees from discussing sexual harassment complaints).
162 SeeWaco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (1984) (invalidating a rule barring employees from discussing wages).
163 See Case Farms of N.C., 353 N.L.R.B. 257, 260 n.12 (2008) (explaining that the NLRA “may encompass employee
communications about labor disputes with newspaper reporters”); Leather Center, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 521, 528 (1993) (“The
Board has consistently held employees have a right under Section 7 of the [NLRA] to convey their complaints or grievances
against their employers to representatives of the media. . . .”).
164 See Pfizer, Inc., Case No. 10-CA-175850, slip op. at 9 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/10-
CA-175850 [https://perma.cc/ANK3-V5QC]; see also Greene & O’Brien, supra note 100, at 846–53 (discussing the Pfizer
decision in great detail).
165 See Pfizer, Case No. 10-CA-175850, at 9.
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substantive/procedural distinction.166 A more trenchant opinion would have distinguished this
substantive right from the sort of procedural rights that have been previously preempted by the
FAA.167
A state interested in protecting workers from the restrictions of confidential arbitration
should pass a law similar in substance to Section 7 of the NLRA and should use the Ninth Circuit’s
carveout to argue that any complexity or obstacles to arbitration caused by the legislation flow from
the substance of the right itself. It would also be wise to carefully enumerate this substantive right to
avoid the risk of a court reading it out of the statute, as the Supreme Court did to the NLRA’s right
to collective action in Epic Systems, and could do once again to the somewhat vague language of the
NLRA.168
B. Limits to the Application of the Ninth Circuit’s Precedent
While exporting the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between substantive and procedural
complexity could lead to significant improvements over today’s arbitration regimes, distinct limits to
its application would likely stretch the precedent beyond its capacity.
1. Rejecting arbitration outright
One of the more drastic state initiatives to combat arbitration can be found in a California
law forbidding employers from mandating that workers enter into arbitration agreements
altogether.169 The law prohibits employers from requiring the waiver of any rights, forums, or
procedures that are otherwise guaranteed by state employment law.170 This is a clear-cut instance of a
state forbidding employers from altering dispute resolution procedures in a manner that is both
inconsistent with Concepcion and not salvageable through the Ninth Circuit’s carveout. The law
attempts to skirt Supreme Court precedent by continuing to enforce arbitration agreements entered
into willingly while establishing that employers may neither require such agreements nor retaliate
against applicants who fail to sign them.171 It is unlikely that this law targeting arbitration through a
“more subtle method”172 can avoid FAA preemption, as it pertains to purely procedural rights.173
Foreseeably, this law has been challenged in federal court and preliminarily enjoined.174
166 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018) (“Nothing in our cases indicates that
the NLRA guarantees class and collective action procedures. . . .”).
167 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
168 See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1628.
169 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.6(a) (West 2020); Alexia F. Campbell, Hollywood and Silicon Valley Can No Longer Silence
Women with This Contract Clause, VOX (Oct. 11, 2019, 12:40 P.M.), https://www.vox.com/identities/
2019/10/11/20909589/california-forced-arbitration-bill-ab-51 [https://perma.cc/96C8-WTC6].
170 LAB. § 432.6(a).
171 See id. § 432.6(a)–(b).
172 Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
173 State laws granting purely procedural rights that interfere with arbitration could not even survive the Ninth
Circuit’s preemption analysis. See supra Section I.B.2.
174 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Becerra, No. 2:19-AT-01142




Other states have taken a more circumscribed approach to combatting arbitration by
limiting their restrictions to cases involving sexual misconduct.175 Many of these laws, passed in the
wake of the #MeToo movement, acknowledge the significant danger that arbitration inflicts on
women in the workforce.176 In one of the first challenges to these laws, overzealous drafting led to
the predictable preemption of a New York law.177 The Southern District of New York dismissed
arguments that the law should avoid preemption because it only targeted one specific type of
arbitration as opposed to disfavoring arbitration generally.178 The court’s finding that the New York
law was preempted by the FAA is entirely consistent with Concepcion’s analysis of FAA preemption,
and a similar preemption verdict should be expected in the case against New Jersey’s version of this
law.179 Even when designed narrowly, any legislation that directly targets arbitration will certainly fail
the first step of an FAA preemption inquiry.180
2. Securing a right to appeal
The lack of judicial review is a valid and common critique of arbitration, and a substantive
right to appeal may seem like a desirable choice for additional legislation.181 Unfortunately, federal law
limits the occasions when judicial review is permitted, and this limitation is so fundamental to
arbitration that any attempt to guarantee such a right would conflict directly with the FAA.182
The likelihood that a state law mandating a right to appeal would be preempted does not
mean that it is impossible to write an arbitration agreement providing for a more substantial right to
review.183 It is theoretically feasible to write appellate procedures into an arbitration agreement, so
long as the provisions are reasonably specific and review is conducted by subsequent arbitrators
outside the judicial system.184 Despite this possibility, such a guarantee does not appear to be a right
that states could require under the aforementioned precedent.185
175 See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.7 (West 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
7515(b) (MCKINNEY 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495h(g) (West 2018).
176 See Frances Kulka Browne & Erika Ghaly, Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims and FAA Preemption,
N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/19/mandatory-arbitration-of-sexual-
harassment-claims-and-faa-preemption/ [https://perma.cc/5BGR-MCU9].
177 See Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107020 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019).
178 See id. at *10.
179 See generally N.J. Civ. Just. Inst. v. Grewal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127806 (D.N.J. July 21, 2020) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss).
180 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
181 See, e.g., Saxe, supra note 14.
182 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (permitting judicial review only in circumstances that clearly undermine the legitimacy of the
arbitration); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350–51 (2011).
183 Merril Hirsh & Nicholas Schuchert, Writing Arbitration Clauses to Get the Arbitration You Want, LAW360 (Aug. 9,
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/826544/writing-arbitration-clauses-to-get-the-arbitration-you-want [https://perma.
cc/2AVF-BJFL] (arguing that it would be possible to write a method of appeal into an arbitration agreement with a second
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators reviewing the first decision for legal error or lack of substantial evidence).
184 See id. But see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 (2008) (insisting that parties cannot expand judicial
review under the FAA).
185 See supra note 183.
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C. The Ultimate Effect on Arbitration Agreements: Walking the Tightrope
While this Article argues that arbitration agreements are a net harm to workers, consumers,
and civil society, states must take the existing legal landscape as it is and not how it ought to be.
Legislation must be carefully tailored, both to avoid preemption and to decrease the risk of creating
an easy case that is ripe for appeal to a court sympathetic to arbitration.
Increased state regulation on consumer and employee protections may eventuate in an
outcome in which corporations find arbitration less attractive.186 If arbitration awards require
corporations to pay remedies to a representative group of victims, the resulting liability from these
binding and unreviewable decisions would dramatically increase. Corporations would need to
determine whether they were interested in designing the complicated terms of an agreement to allow
PAGA claims and public injunctions or whether it would be more advantageous to abandon the
process altogether and hope for a favorable decision in court.187 While this trend would not prescribe
the end of arbitration, the increased liability risk could have a measurable impact on corporate
incentives to bind their employees and consumers to mandatory arbitration.188 This prediction that
companies will abandon arbitration once it becomes a liability was borne out by Amazon’s recent
decision to drop a mandatory arbitration provision from its consumer terms of service.189 The
decision came after 75,000 demands for arbitration inundated the retailer with millions of dollars’
worth of filing fees.190
Although a decrease in the total number of arbitration agreements would be beneficial to
employees and consumers, this outcome cannot be the express or plainly discoverable objective of
any state legislation.191 Once this objective becomes more than a beneficial byproduct of a state law, it
would expose the law to immediate preemption.192 This Article in no way advocates for legislators to
186 See Alison Frankel, The 9th Circuit Just Blew Up Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Cases, REUTERS (July 1, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-injunction/the-9th-circuit-just-blew-up-mandatory-arbitration-in-consumer-cases-
idUSKCN1TW3O0 [https://perma.cc/RW7G-XAK4] (“[C]orporations will be faced with the interesting choice of whether to
attempt to set the terms of injunctive arbitration in order to avoid litigating class actions in court.”).
187 See id. (explaining corporations’ belief that classwide arbitration is tilted against companies, expensive, and
unwieldy, and thus gives undue leverage to consumers).
188 Concepcion contains some dicta that may be construed as disfavoring any rule that has a deterrent effect on the
incentives to arbitrate. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 n.8 (2011) (“The point is that in class-action
arbitration huge awards (with limited judicial review) will be entirely predictable, thus rendering arbitration unattractive. It is
not reasonably deniable that requiring consumer disputes to be arbitrated on a classwide basis will have a substantial deterrent
effect on incentives to arbitrate.”). Like other aspects of the decision, it is necessary to read these statements in light of
Mitsubishi to understand the precedential limits. It simply cannot be the case that any state law making arbitration less attractive
is immediately preempted, and appealing to the distinction between substantial complexity and procedural complexity is a
viable and straightforward interpretation of this potential contradiction.




191 But see Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (2019) (arguing that states
should pass legislation with the intent of deterring parties from entering into arbitration in the first place).
192 See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (“The [FAA] also displaces any rule




fabricate pretextual objectives that obscure their true intentions; instead, it urges states to recognize
and emphasize the value and necessity of generally applicable protections from restrictive arbitration
clauses. Mandatory arbitration will persist until Congress takes more direct action, but in the interim,
consumers and employees deserve assurances that their substantive rights will not be stripped away.
Protecting the right to discuss the terms of one’s employment or the freedom to work together with
other consumers to vindicate a wrong are beneficial ends unto themselves and are valuable safeguards
in any contractual context. With mandatory arbitration becoming a fact of modern life,193 states must
provide the protections that those with diminished bargaining power cannot ensure for themselves.
CONCLUSION
Even as the prevalence of arbitration agreements seems inevitable for the foreseeable future,
legislative protections can and must be implemented at the state level to counter their worst abuses.
In the absence of bipartisan support for federal legislation and the limited reach of direct action, state
legislatures have the greatest capacity to stem the tide of arbitration in the United States and restore
the promise of just restitution to a class of mistreated workers and consumers.
The Ninth Circuit has offered a cure to a decade of detrimental judicial decisions and a
blueprint for building a new generation of safeguards against rising corporate power and abuse. The
complexity distinction is a logically sound and easily exported analysis that is compatible with
established arbitration law in many jurisdictions. States have already shown that they are eager to
intervene to combat excessive arbitration, but they must draft careful and precise legislation to ensure
a lasting impact. The Ninth Circuit’s cabined view of FAA preemption provides a guide to crafting
legislation that accurately harnesses the power of the disparate, mistreated majority of which Vanina
Guerrero is so emblematic—a majority that seeks to counter and expose a pattern of commercial
misconduct that might otherwise proceed unabated.
of arbitration agreements.”) (emphasis added).
193 See discussion supra Section I.A.
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